II. THE INSTRUMENT PROBLEM
The proper choice of monetary policy instruments is a topic which has been hotly debated in recent years. Three major positions in the debate may be identified. First, there are those who argue that monetary policy should set the money stock while letting the interest rate fluctuate as it will. In one variant of this position the authorities should simply achieve a constant rate of growth of the money stock; in another variant the authorities should adjust the growth in the money stock in response to the current state of the economy, causing the money stock to grow more rapidly in recession and less rapidly in boom.
The second major position in the debate is held by those who favor using money market conditions as the monetary policy instrument. The more precise proponents of this general position would argue that the authorities should push interest rates up in times of boom and down in times of recession, while the money supply is allowed to fluctuate as it will. Others, while conceding the importance of interest rates, would also tend to think in terms of the level of free reserves in the banking system, the rate of growth of bank credit with one or more components of bank credit being specially emphasized, or the overall "tone" of the money markets. Most proponents of this position would probably agree that the short-term interest rate is the best single variable to represent money market conditions if a single variable must be selected for analytical purposes.
The third major position is taken by the fence-sitters who argue that the monetary authorities should use both the money stock and the interest rate as instruments. It is, of course, recognized that the money stock and the interest rate cannot be set independently, but the idea seems to be to maintain some sort of relationship between the two instruments. The trouble with this position is that it usually amounts to nothing more than a plea for wise behavior by the authorities since it is never explained how the instruments should be adjusted according to economic conditions. However, as shown in Section IV, this position can be made precise within the context of a well-defined model.
The very existence of the instrument problem may puzzle those who are used to thinking of policy formulation in terms of a deterministic macro model. In such a model, assuming that it is possible to reach full employment through monetary policy, the policy prescription may be in terms of either the interest rate or the money Figure I shows the familiar IS-LM diagram in which the price level is assumed constant. The monetary policy problem is viewed as setting the money stock at the level such that the LM function will cut the IS function at the full employment level of income, YfAlternatively, the policy problem could be viewed as in Figure II with the monetary authorities setting the interest rate at r*,' thereby making the LM function horizontal.2 In the deterministic model it obviously makes no difference whatsoever whether the policy prescription is in terms of setting the interest rate at r* or in terms of setting the money stock at the level, say M*, that makes the LM function cut the IS function at Yf.
But now consider Figure III , in which the IS function is ran- Figure III it is clear that there is a problem of the proper choice of the instrument, and that the problem should be resolved by setting the money stock at M* while letting the interest rate end up where it will rather than by setting the interest rate at r* and letting the money stock end up at whatever level is necessary to obtain r*.
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In Figure IV the situation is analyzed in which the IS function is stable but the money demand function is randomly shocked. Setting the money stock at M* will lead to an LM function between LM1 and LM2, and income between Y1 and Y2, while setting the interest rate at r* will lead to LM3 and Yf. The interest rate is the proper instrument in this case.
In general there will be stochastic disturbances in both the real and the monetary sectors of the economy. In examining the situa-tions represented by Figures III and IV, it appears that in the general case the solution of the instrument problem depends on the relative importance of the random disturbances and on the slopes of the IS and LM functions, i.e., on the structural parameters of the system. With these general ideas in mind, it is now possible to proceed to a formal model. With a desired level of real income of Yf,4 from the reduced forms for income we obtain the optimal values for the instrument, r* or M*, respectively, as given by equations (4) and (5).
3. It can be assumed either that monetary policy can control the real stock of money, at least in the short run, by altering the nominal stock or that the price level is fixed. Alternatively, it could be assumed that the variables in the model are all money magnitudes; in this case, the desired level of income, Yt, discussed below in real terms, would become instead the desired level of money income such that the economy would be operating at "reasonably" full employment and a "tolerable" rate of price increase. These awkward rationalizations of the economic meaning of the model are, of course, the result of working within a simple model with only the one goal variable, national income. 4. Income above Y, is undesirable due to resource misallocations at overfull employment or upward pressure on the price level. In this model the level of income is a random variable, and in general its probability distribution will depend on whether the money stock or the interest rate is selected as the policy instrument. It is natural to argue that the selection of the instrument should depend on which instrument minimizes the expected loss from failure of the level of income to equal the desired level. Let us assume a quadratic loss function 6 SO that the expected loss, L, is given by
It can easily be shown that if the interest rate is the instrument, the minimum expected loss is obtained when r = r* as given by equation (4) ; similarly, if the money stock is the instrument, the optimal money stock is M=M* as given by equation (5) .7 Once the instrument has been selected, the model is one of certainty equivalence under the loss function of equation (7), and the optimal policy in the stochastic model is identical to the optimal policy in the deterministic model. However, as can be seen from the reduced forms (8) and (9) for interest rate and money stock policies, respectively, in the stochastic 5. In the model presented there is one goal variable and one instrument to be chosen from two possible instruments. In more complicated models, say where there is a choice of two out of three possible instruments and one goal variable, the optimal policy will lie along a line connecting the two instruments chosen. When a point on this line is selected, the value of the variable rejected as an instrument will be determined by the model. (7)), we obtain the minimum expected loss, L, under an interest rate policy, and by substituting (9) into the loss function, we obtain the minimum expected loss, LM, under a money stock policy, as given by equations (10) What this means is that the higher is the interest sensitivity of the demand for money (the lower b2 is algebraically), the lower is the minimum expected loss from a money stock policy. The intuitive explanation for this result (which may on first thought seem peculiar) is as follows: first, note that this result requires puv <0, which means that there is a tendency for disturbances in the two sectors to be simultaneously expansionary or contractionary. Second, note that aV must be relatively large compared to b1jo-,. Under these conditions the effect on income of the relatively large disturbances in the monetary sector is smaller, the larger is the interest sensitivity of the demand for money. As will be shown below, in this situation an interest rate policy is superior to a money stock policy. Another aspect of the interest sensitivity is that in general Lm is at a minimum at a nonzero value of b2 which may be negative, which means that in some cases a small amount of interest sensitivity is better than none. This fact can be seen by setting (12) equal to zero to find the extremum. The second order conditions assure that this extremum is always a minimum. It is then found that for b2<0 at this minimum, it is necessary that puv+ b1?> 0 and bip.V+? > 0.
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It can also be shown that at this minimum a money stock policy is superior to an interest rate policy. Since the conditions for a minimum Lm to occur at b2 <0 are likely to be met in practice, these results suggest that some interest sensitivity may well be better than none. Indeed, as shown in the next section this fact may be exploited by deliberately introducing an interest-sensitive supply of money into the model. The two policies may now be conveniently compared by considering the ratio of their expected losses. which instrument is optimal may vary over time if the structural and stochastic parameters change. This analysis, based on the size of r may be compared to the Friedman-Meiselman view that monetary policy is superior to fiscal policy because velocity is more stable than the investment multiplier.' In fact, in the model of (6) fiscal policy and an interest rate policy are equivalent in terms of their effects on income since in (6a) fiscal policy affects the term a, while an interest rate policy affects the term air. But it is important to note that the condition at,<r, is not alone sufficient to insure the superiority of the money stock policy.
The stochastic model is one of certainty equivalence in the decision sense but not in the utility sense. Whichever instrument is selected, the optimal decision is the same in the stochastic model as in the certainty model. However, the stochastic model is not equivalent in the utility sense since the level of disutility is zero in the certainty model but nonzero and dependent on the choice of the policy instrument in the stochastic model.
The stochastic terms in the model may be interpreted as arising from a one-period lag in data availability on the level of income. If income data were available instantaneously, then random disturbances would show up immediately in terms of their effects on income, and the policy instrument could be adjusted accordingly, assuming, of course, that policy actions took effect instantaneously. But if information on the goal variable becomes available with a lag, the instantaneous feedback principle is no longer applicable, and it is necessary to think of the goal variable as being a function of the instrument. For monetary policy problems it seems quite reasonable to think of information on money and interest as being continuously available while information on income is available only with a lag.
Thus, the time subscripts on Y, M, and r are all identical in (6a) and (6b), but Yt is not observable until t+1.
Lags in the effects of policy actions may or may not produce a model analytically equivalent to (6a) and (6b); it is necessary to specify the nature of the lags. If production, consumption, and money demand decisions are made one period in advance, the model might be 
Yt+1 = ao+alrt+ut+l
Mt= bo+bYt+i+b2rt+vt+i. This model is analytically equivalent to (6a) and (6b). The money demand function may appear a bit strange, but it is possible that the amount of money demanded this period is based on production plans made this period which will determine next period's income.
IV. THE COMBINATION POLICY
It will be recalled that under the money stock policy there is an optimal value for b2, the interest sensitivity of the demand for money. Since it would be a most unlikely coincidence for the actual value of b2 to equal the optimal value, it should be possible to obtain the optimal slope to the LM function by making the supply of money interest sensitive. Whether the supply of money should be positively or negatively related to the interest rate will depend on whether the slope of the LM function with a fixed money stock is too high or too low.
Consider the policy defined in terms of setting values for c', and C'2 in a money supply equation2 given by M= c'l + c'2r. However, because the denominators of the optimal c'1 and c'2 vanish for certain parameter values, it is convenient to define the money supply function by equation ( In equation (16) it can be seen that the combination policy becomes a pure interest rate policy when c,=O, and becomes a pure money stock policy when c2* -0 3It should be obvious that except in these special cases in which either co or c2 vanish, the combination policy is superior to both of the pure policies.4
The expected losses under the combination policy may be substantially less than the expected losses under either of the pure policies.5 The explicit specification of a combination policy allows the "fence-sitters" in the debate to stay on the fence and to feel superior in doing so. However, the success of the combination policy depends on knowledge of the parameters of the model, and the combination policy depends on knowledge of more parameters than does a pure money stock or a pure interest rate policy. Furthermore, it is clear from equation (16) Period by period, then, the optimal level of each of the three policies is given by the same expressions as before except that the constant term ao in these expressions is replaced by ao+S1Yt-1+S2Yt_2. It is easy to see that if any one of the policies is followed period by period the dependence of income on lagged income will be eliminated.7 A policy adjusted period by period might be called an "active" policy. Professor Friedman has argued that a successful active policy is impossible given the current state of knowledge, and that we would be better off with a steady rate of growth of money regardless of current conditions. Such a policy might be called a "passive" policy. The model of this paper involves no economic growth, and so the analog to Friedman's proposal is a money stock fixed permanently. We may also consider a permanent interest rate policy.8
Friedman's position is based on his contention that the lags in the effects of monetary policy are long and variable, and so it may 6. At this stage of the argument it would be a trivial matter to add lagged income terms to the money demand equation or lagged interest rate terms to either or both equations. These terms could all be incorporated into the constant terms. While the later analysis would not be affected in any fundamental way by adding lagged income terms to the money demand equations, the presence of both lagged income and lagged interest terms would make the algebra later on difficult and perhaps impossible.
7. In the combination policy, ct* (though not co and c2*) is itself a random variable depending on Yt-1 and Yt-2, and it is therefore necessary to see whether c1* has a finite mean and variance. If it did not, the policy would presumably not be feasible. However, it is easy to see that cl* does have a finite mean and variance. The mean and variance of cl* depend on the means and variances of Yt-l and Yt_2 which in turn depend on the means and variances of the disturbances in periods t-1 and t-2, but in no earlier periods since the dependence of Y on lagged Y is eliminated by the optimal combination policy. Therefore, it is clear that the mean and variance of c1* exist, and the same argument applies to the interest rate and money stock policies. well be unfair to analyze the merits of his position within the model given by (18). However, this model does seem to have some relevance to the problem. First, note that Friedman's position does not depend per se on existence of lags in the effects of monetary changes, but rather on the inability to predict the level of income at the time when monetary actions take effect regardless of whether or not this effect occurs with a lag. The longer and more variable the lag, of course, the less accurate are income predictions likely to be. The dynamic model of (18) includes both predictable income changes through the influence of the lagged income terms and unpredictable income changes through the influence of the random terms, and so does represent, at least in part, the nature of the problem that led Friedman to his position.
The second aspect of this model to be noted is that the timing relationship between turning points in money and income is variable due to the random terms u and v even though the partial effect of money on income does not have a variable lag. Thus, the model is consistent with Friedman's findings on the variability of the lag between turning points in money and income.9 Friedman's argument for a constant rate of growth in the money stock depends on variability in the partial effects of money on income. In passing, it might be mentioned that the only way to obtain evidence on the variability of the partial effects of money on income would be to show either that in a model of the economy the estimated regression coefficients were statistically significantly different from one period to another, or that the variability in the lag in turning points could not occur in a model with constant partial effects of money on income unless a most improbable probability distribution of the disturbance terms existed.
In analyzing passive policies, consider first the interest rate policy of setting r= r permanently. It is optimal to set the interest rate according to ( In comparing the active and passive policies, it is clear that the expected loss under the passive policy is greater than under the active policy. While the optimal active and passive policies were in both cases derived under the assumption of known parameters, even if the parameters are not known exactly the analysis suggests that a nonoptimal active policy may still be superior to an optimal passive policy. With incomplete knowledge, a sensible procedure might be to start from a base policy of a fixed money stock (which is most likely superior to a fixed interest rate), and then to move away from this base somewhat cautiously in implementing an active policy.
VI. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
The choice of instruments problem is clearly a consequence of uncertainty, and analysis of the problem requires a stochastic model. The basic model of this paper is the simplest possible model within which the nature of the problem can be carefully defined and a solution determined. It is obvious that while the model provides some insight into the solution of the problem as faced by practical policymakers, its main value is in clarifying the nature of the problem and suggesting an approach which might be applied to more complete and realistic models.
While the instrument problem has been analyzed as a monetary policy problem, it is worth pointing out that a similar problem arises in fiscal policy. Here the problem is whether the government should set income tax rates allowing tax revenues to be an endogenous variable or set tax receipts (through head taxes or property taxes) allowing the implicit income tax rate to be endogenous. While the income tax is usually viewed as a built-in stablizer, it might be possible to construct a plausible stochastic model in which the property tax stabilized income better than an income tax with the same expected revenue.
Except for a few passing comments no attention has been paid to the very important problem of the effect of uncertainty as to the values of the parameters of the model. In principle what should be done is to treat each parameter as a random variable,3 but in even the simple model of this paper this approach is analytically intractable due to the large number of variances and co-variances involved, and the existence of products and ratios of random variables in the reduced form equations. A more promising approach might be to employ a sensitivity analysis to see how the results based on known parameters would differ if the parameters differed by plausible amounts from the estimates used in the analysis.
